This essay examines the juristic discourse on Muslim minorities from the second/eighth century to the eleventh/seventeenth century with regard to (1) whether or not Muslims may reside in non-Muslim territory and under what circumstances; (2) the relationship of these Muslims to d�r al-Isl�m; and (3) the ethical and legal duties that these Muslims owe to the Shar�'a and to their host non-Muslim polity.
possible for a Muslim only if lived in an Islamic polity that dutifully applies the Shari'a. Consequently, a certain dichotomy results. On the one hand, there is the abode of Islam (dfr al-lsläm) where it is possible to live an ethical life under the guidance of the Shari'a. On the other hand, there is the abode of unbelief (ddr al-kufr, ddr al-harb or dar al-shirk) where the Shari'a is not applied, and Islamic justice does not prevail.l The historical reasons for this dichotomous language, and what it actually means is a multifaceted matter. But ultimately this dichotomous view is largely theory, and theory is often harshly tested by history. As often occurs, the precise lines delineated by theory or religious dogma are blurred by the trials of history. The history of the juristic discourse on the problem of Muslim minorities is the history of an attempt to reconcile the demands of theory with the challenges of history.
Several writers have argued that because of this dichotomous position, the "Muslim worldview" is insular and exclusive. Bernard Lewis asserted that in Islamic thought " [j] ust as there is only one God in heaven, so there can be only one sovereign and one law on earth," that is, the sovereignty of ddr al-lsläm and the law of Shari'a.2 The lands of Islam are superior to lands where Islam does not prevail, and even if the non-Muslim world is temporarily tolerated, ultimately it must be converted to Islam through jihdd.3 The existence of Muslim minorities voluntarily residing in non-Muslim territory complicates this issue and raises questions as to the significance of the purported Islamic worldview. If the position of Muslim minorities is the exception to this worldview, it is often the case that the exception is much more worthy of study than the rule. The material reviewed in this essay suggests that the linguistic dichotomy, ddr al-lsläm versus ddr al-harb obscures a much more complex historical reality.
In this essay I will review the pre-modern juristic discourse on Muslim minorities, emphasizing the main issues of contention and debate within this juristic tradition. My objective is to call attention to the complexities of this field of research and to raise issues deserving of further exploration. For centuries large Muslim populations lived in 1 Throughout this essay I will use the Arabic term dar al-Isl�m in the sense of "the land of Islam" and d�r al-harb in the sense of the "lands of non-Muslims. non-Muslim territories, and a study of the juristic reaction to this historical fact may lead to a better understanding of the linguistic dichotomy between ddr al-Isldm and ddr al-harb. Because this field of research remains largely undeveloped, I will survey the pre-modem juridical literature on three main issues from the second/eighth century to the eleventh/seventeenth century: (1) whether or not Muslims may reside in non-Muslim territory and under what circumstances;
(2) the relationship of these Muslims to ddr al-Isldm; and (3) how Islamic law applies or is to be applied by these Muslims. At issue are the ethical and legal duties that these Muslims owe to the Shari'a and to their host polity. Some concepts discussed here, such as hijra, were used in Muslim sectarian debates and as oppositional doctrines to Muslim rulers. This aspect of the study, which requires separate treatment, will not be dealt with here.
I will argue that systematic juristic positions on the issue of Muslim minorities developed after the sixth/twelfth century and that the varied juridical positions were a function of historical specificity. The reaction of different jurists reflected a dynamic process by which doctrinal sources, legal precedents, juristic methodologies and historical reality interacted to produce diverse results.
l. Where May Muslims Reside?
The Early Positions
The Prophet established a city-state after emigrating to Medina in 10/622. The Qur'an, especially after the pact of Hudaybiyya (628-630), emphasized the principle that all Muslims are obliged to perform migration (hijra) to the Prophet.4 Significantly, before the Prophet emigrated to Medina, a group of Muslims escaped persecution in Mecca by seeking sanctuary in Abyssinia, a Christian state (615) (616) (617) (618) (619) (620) (621) (622) . Hence the idea of performing hijra to escape persecution and to propagate the faith was established at an early date.5 4 See Q. 8:72, Q. 4:89 and Q. 4:100. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of the Qur'�n are from Ahmed Ali, Al-Qur'�n (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) . Slight changes have been made to reflect my understanding of the original.
5 On the centrality of hijra in Muslim theology, see Montgomery Watt, "Hidjra", Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (1971) , 366-67; Muhammad Khalid Masud, "Shehu Usuman Dan Fodio's Restatement of the Doctrine of Hijrah," Islamic Studies, 25:1 (1986), 56-77; idem, "The Obligation of Hijra in Islamic Law," in Muslim Travellers, ed. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) , 29-32; idem, Complementing these historical precedents were three Qur'anic injunctions which instructed not only Muslims but also Jews and Christians to govern themselves by what God had decreed for each of them. Q. 5:44 reads, "Those who do not judge by God's revelations are infidels indeed."6 Additionally, Q. 5:5 calls upon Muslims not to ally themselves with Christians or Jews: "0 believers, do not hold Jews and Christians as your allies. They are allies of one another and anyone who makes them his allies is surely one of them; and God does not guide the unjust." Finally, Q. 4:97-100 calls upon Muslims to escape oppression by migrating in the cause of God:
As for those whose souls are taken by the angels (at death) while in a state of injustice against themselves, they will be asked by the angels: "What state were you in?" They will answer: "We were oppressed in the land." And the angels will say: "Was not God's earth large enough for you to migrate?"... But those who are helpless, men, women and children, who can neither contrive a plan nor do they know the way, may well hope for the mercy of God; and God is full of mercy and grace. Whosoever migrates in the cause of God will find many places of refuge and abundance on the earth.7
These three injunctions did not necessarily lead to a consistent result. What did the Qur'an mean by those who "were oppressed," and is oppression synonymous with living in non-Muslim lands? What if a Muslim encounters oppression in an Islamic land and the only haven is non-Islamic territory; in that case, what becomes of the injunction not to take Christians and Jews as allies? And how is one to govern by what God has decreed if one escapes to non-Muslim territory?
Adding to the complexity of the problem are several hadiths that forbade Muslims from living in the lands of unbelief. One such hadith states: "Whoever associates with an infidel and lives with him, he is like him." Other hadiths state that hijra is an ongoing obligation. For instance, the Prophet is reported to have said, "The hijra will not come to an end as long as the infidels are fought." Inconsistently, however, other badiths assert that the duty of hijra ended with the conquest of Mecca.8 "Being a Muslim in a Non-Muslim Polity," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, 10:1 (Jan. 1989), 120.
6 Also see Q. 5:49. For Jews, see Q. 5:44-45; for Christians, see Q. 5: [47] [48] n.d.), vol. 19, . For a discussion of these had�ths, see Masud, "Obligation, [33] [34] ; Wilfred Madelung, "Has the Hijra Come to an End?", La Revue Des Etudes Islamiques, LIV (1986) , 227.
The issues raised by the historical and doctrinal precedents were not only of theoretical significance. The concept of hijra played a role both in the internal political struggles of the early Islamic state9 and in matters relating to foreign policy. Since the second/eighth century, significant Muslim populations have resided in non-Muslim territories, especially in coastal India and China. In the late Umayyad period, Muslims reportedly fled the tyranny of al-Hajjaj b. by taking refuge in Malabar, India. During the reign of al-Mahdi (158-169/775-785) and , Muslim lands were lost to non-Muslim rule.10 In the fifth/eleventh century, large Muslim populations came under non-Muslim rule in Messina and Sicily. The problem of how to treat Muslims who reside in nonMuslim territory became particularly urgent in the seventh/thirteenth century, when vast Muslim territory was conquered in the East by Mongols and in the West by Christians.' 1 These historical challenges elicited a variety of responses from Muslim jurists. Some jurists argued that Islam and ddr al-Isldm are inseparable and that Muslims therefore may not reside in non-Muslim lands under any circumstance.
Other jurists conceived of hijra as a dynamic concept that requires Muslims to be in a constant search for lands in which they can attain greater religious fulfilment; some of these jurists argued that it may be recommended or even obligatory for a Muslim to reside among unbelievers. The early jurists addressed the issue of a non-Muslim who converted to Islam while in non-Muslim territory. Should that person now migrate to dar al-Isläm? One might expect Sunni jurists who were accustomed to the formal association of the polity with Islam to demand that such a person immediately migrate to ddr al-l släm.12 But examination of the historical progression of juridical thought on the issue suggests that such an assertion should be qualified. 13 Ab� Bakr al-Sarakhs�, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kab�r, ed. S. al-Munajjid (Cairo: Ma'had al-Makht�t�t, 1971), vol. I, 94 (a commentary on a work attributed to alShayb�n� entitled al-Siyar al-Kab�r -hereinafter "al-Shayb�n�"). Writing many years after al-Shayb�n�, Ab� Bakr al-Sarakhs� explained that although the duty to migrate was abrogated, most jurists recommended that the nomads migrate to Medina so that they might learn their religion; but if these nomads could learn their religious duties in their tribal residence, there was no reason for them to migrate. See al-Mabs�t (Beirut: D�r al-Ma'rifa, 1986), vol. 10, 94-95 . Although lawbooks cite the example of the nomads residing outside of Medina as if it were a politically neutral issue, this was a bitterly contested domestic issue in the Umayyad period (see Madelung, " Hijra"). The political debates concerning who is an emigré (muh�jir) and who is entitled to spoils of war (fiya') had little to do at that early stage with Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory. See also Ab� al-Hasan al-M�ward�, al-Ahk�m al-Sult�niyya (Beirut: D�r al-Kutub al- 'Ilmiyya, 1985) , 163-64. 14 Ab� 'Abd Allah al-Shayb�n�, The By the end of the third/ninth century, several unrefined notions had emerged. Malik's view that Muslims should never be subject to nonMuslim law entailed a hostility to Muslims leaving the territories of Islam even for the purpose of trade. The Hanafis did not oppose sojourns for the purpose of trade, although they discouraged permanent residence by Muslims in the territory of non-Muslims.
For al-Shafi'i, who focused on the threat of losing one's religious beliefs, each case turned on its specific circumstances.
Al-Tabari (d. 310/923), the founder of a shortlived school of law, discussed several other operative causes that subsequently were developed and systematized. In commenting on the Qur'anic verses regarding the duty to migrate from the lands of oppression (see above), he states that at the time of the Prophet those who failed to join the Islamic state in Medina were considered infidels, although this rule was abrogated prior to the Prophet's death. Al-Tabari explains that these Qur'anic verses refer to a specific group of people who converted to Islam but refused to join the Prophet in Medina, preferring to stay in Mecca. The Prophet required them to migrate to Medina because they were unable to worship freely in Mecca. Hence, the operative cause ( `illat al-hukm) is the inability to practice Islam. But al-Tabari also mentions that it is improper for a Muslim to prefer the territory of unbelievers over Islamic lands, and he argues that the group of Muslims specifically addressed by the Qur'anic verses was culpable for contributing to the strength of unbelievers who were fighting the Prophet at the time (takthir sawdd al-kufllir ) . 1 8 17 Ab� 'Abd Allah al-Sh�fi'�, al-Umm, ed. Muhammad al-Najj�r (Beirut: D�r al-Ma'rifa, n.d.), vol. 4, 161.
18 Ab� Ja'far al-Tabar�, J�mi' al-Bay�n (Beirut: D�r al-Ma'rifa, 1986) , vol 4, 147-51. Al-Tabari records several conflicting reports regarding what motivated this Muslim group to refuse to join the Prophet. In addition to Tabari, see also Ab� alQ�sim al-Zamakhshar�, al-Kashsh�f (Beirut: D�r al-Ma'rifa, n.d.), vol. 1, 292-93; Ab� al-Fida¸ Ibn Kathir, Tafs�r Ibn Kath�r (Cairo: D�r al-Kh�r, 1988), vol. 1, 513-15 ; Mahm�d al-�l�s�, R�h al-Ma'�n� (Beirut: D�r Ihy�' al-Tur�th al-'Arab�, 1985), vol. 5, 125-26 Other jurists of the sixth/twelfth century, notably from the Shafi'i and She' schools, argued that a Muslim is permitted to reside in nonMuslim lands if he or she is able to manifest his or her religion, but that hijra from non-Muslim territory is obligatory if a person fears the loss of religion (khashiyya an yuftana fi dinihi).31
Several jurists extended their discussions of hijra beyond the dichotomy between dar al-l släm, and ddr al-harb. They insisted that a Muslim should leave any territory in which corruption is widespread or in which a Muslim is not physically secure. Therefore, one should migrate to places where one can attain greater religious fulfillment and physical safety. This view may have been a natural extension of the early reports regarding the Muslim emigrants to Abyssinia who reportedly fled from oppression in Mecca, and of the reports regarding the nomads of Arabia. More important, it was a direct result of the internal theological and political divisions that plagued the Islamic Empire. By the third/ninth century, the Mu'tazila, Zaydiya and Khawarij schools developed well-formulated doctrines requiring hijra from lands formally ruled by Muslim rulers. Shi'i jurists distinguished between ddr al-imdn (the abode of true faith) and ddr al-Isldm.
Qualitatively, dar al-l släm could be equivalent to ddr al-kufr if corrupt beliefs and practices are widespread, but in the absence of the abode of true faith Muslims may continue to reside in corrupt territories as long as they can practice their religion.32 From the perspective of these Muhammad B�qir al-Najaf� (d. 1266/1850), Jaw�hir al-Kal�m, ed. Muhammad oppositional groups, a just life is not necessarily achieved in a territory that formally espouses Islam. Rather one must engage in a constant search for a just land and for physical safety or one must migrate to territory under Muslim control.33 As noted earlier, the role hijra played in the internal political conflicts in Islamic history is outside the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that this debate has been the subject of continuous juridical discussion up to and including the late ninteentth and early twentieth centuries.
The Developed Positions
Well-formulated, recognizable schools of thought on the problem of Muslims in non-Muslim territory emerge only after the sixth/twelfth century. As always, these schools of thought manifest a richness of diversity and many minor variations. Each school adopted a cohesive position which it applied, at times, with compulsive rigidity.
The Maliki school adopted an uncompromising position. A Muslim should never reside in non-Muslim territory, primarily because he or , including leaving non-Muslim territory, but he also explains that a person should migrate from areas in which his or her money or person is not secure, and from places of widespread corruption, even if this territory is formally a part of d�r al-Isl�m. Zaydis: Ibn Muhammad al-Shawk�n� (d. 1250/1834), Nayl al-Awt�r (Cairo: Dar al-Had�th, n.d.), vol. 8, 27 (reporting and discussing different opinions). Shi'�s: al-Tabris�, Majma', vol. 3, 151 does not mention the duty to leave non-Muslim territory, limiting himself to reporting that one should leave the land of corruption. The Mu'tazil�, al-Zamakhshar� (d. 538/1144), al-Kashsh�f, vol. 1, 292-93, states that although the duty to migrate (w�jib al-hijra) had been abrogated, one should migrate to lands in which one may attain greater religious fulfilment.
she will be subject to non-Muslim laws. The firstfatwä deals with Mudejars who left al-Andalus for North Africa and who subsequently encountered financial difficulties. Consequently, they regretted their hijra and mocked Muslim North Africa, claiming that the Christian land from which they came was superior. "Hijra," they mocked, "should really be from here [North Africa] to there [the Christian territory]." The questioner asks the suggestive question: "What do you think of these people?" Al-Wansharisi begins his response in a detached, scholarly manner, arguing that hijra from non-Muslim territory is an absolute duty. After reviewing the conflicting doctrinal sources, he concludes that the conflict is only apparent and that all the evidence leads to a single conclusion. Al-Wansharisi rejects the argument that corruption had become widespread and that all lands therefore are equal in status. The territory of Islam, even if unjust, is superior to non-Muslim territory, even if just.35 Apparently al-Wansharisi believed that formal association with Islam is an ultimate moral value that outweighs any consideration of substantive justice. Al-Wansharisi next argues that it is immaterial whether or not the territory in question was originally a Muslim land. Some have argued that there is a material difference between a Muslim who finds himself or herself in land that historically has been non-Muslim and land that used to be Muslim but was conquered by non-Muslims. Although alWansharisi dismisses this argument as a distinction without a difference, other jurists argued that conquered Muslim territory generally remains Muslim territory despite non-Muslim rule.36
34 On this fatw�, see Husayn Mu'nis, "Asn�," and L.P. Harvey, Islamic
Spain: 1250 to 1500 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 56-63. 35 Al-Wansharisi is responding here to a practical concern expressed by jurists who argued that the material issue is safety and justice and that if corruption spreads, there is no duty to migrate because all lands become equal in status. See, for example, Mughni, vol. 4, 239. 36 The argument that conquered territory remains Muslim as long as the laws of Islam are applied is a typical Hanaf� position (see below).
After finishing his scholarly exposition, al-Wansharisi reveals the essentially political nature of this issue. He condemns in the strongest possible terms those who mock the Muslim lands of Islam. How could anyone say Christian territory is superior! Such a claim reveals the hypocritical and immoral nature of people who lack any appreciation or judgment. How could anyone prefer the company of non-Muslims over Muslims? The intensity of the competition between Christians and Muslims and the deep sense of humiliation that al-Wansharisi feels is evident in his emotional language
The social and political considerations that preoccupied al-Wansharisi are even more apparent in the second fatwä. The question, which originated from Marbella subsequent to its conquest in the late 1400'S,38 mentions the case of a man who remained in that town in order to search for his missing brother. Although the brother was never found, the man continued to reside in Marbella because his unique skills made him an effective liaison between the Christian authorities and the resident Muslims. He interceded on the behalf of the Muslims, acting as their spokesperson and advocate. Although he was free to leave, he remained because the Muslims were poor and needed his services.39
Al-Wansharisi responds unequivocally that the man must leave Marbella immediately, basing his response on what he believes to be historical precedent.
He argues that anyone who resides in nonMuslim territory, even for lofty purposes, exposes himself to subjugation and degradation.
History specify that a Muslim judge should be appointed and that Muslims should demand a Muslim governor.50 The problem, however, is that the Hanafi school maintains that if a locality has a Muslim judge and applies Islamic laws, then it is considered a part of dar al-Isldm and not ddr al-kufr. Other jurists, mostly Shäfi'ï and Hanbali, speak in terms of "duties of religion" (wdjibdt al-din) or in terms of wherever "worship" ('ibdda) is possible. Wäjibät al-din or 'ibtda commonly refers to 'ibC7ddt and not mu 'ämalät, that is, acts of private worship such as prayer and fasting and not commercial or criminal lawS.51 Shi'i jurists often refer to "religious rites" (sha 't' ir al-din), explaining that sha't'ir are like prayer and fasting.52 In fact, there is no consensus among jurists with regard to the level of freedom necessary for Muslims in non-Muslim territory. Perhaps the vagueness of their expressions on this point indicates that the jurists did not wish to articulate a fixed, unnegotiable rule that might be difficult to apply to specific situations, especially situations in which Muslim territory is occupied by non-Muslims.
Like the Hanbali and Ja'fari jurists, Shäfi'ï and Hanafi jurists were concerned about freedom to practice Islam in non-Muslim territory, but they reached conclusions very different from those reached by other schools. According to these two schools, continued residence in nonMuslim territory might at times be either recommended or obligatory.
They reached this conclusion partly because their conception of dar alIsldm was less precise and consequently more flexible. Under certain circumstances, although ultimate sovereignty in a particular territory might belong to non-Muslims, this territory nevertheless may be treated as a part of dar al-Isldm.
We have already encountered this position in its rudimentary form in al-Mawardi's opinion from the fifth/eleventh century. The best introduction to this position in its developed form may be found in two hitherto unstudied Shdfi'ifatwds issued by al-Ramli ( While describing a very favorable situation and a general sense of security, the mustafti betrays a sense of insecurity and distrust.
According to the questioner, there are no guarantees that the present situation will continue indefinitely. Al-Ramli, citing the precedent of a
Companion who was allowed to reside in non-Muslim Mecca, replies that these Muslims do not have to emigrate because they can manifest their religion. He then argues that it is not allowed for them to leave because their residence might be the mechanism by which Islam could spread. Significantly, al-Ramli contends that the area in which they reside is part of ddr al-Isldm and that if they left, it would revert to being ddr al-kufr. The long period during which Muslims have been able to enjoy their religious freedoms creates the presumption that they will be safe from forced conversion or oppression in the future.54
In Despite the ambiguity, these classifications are juridically significant because if a territory is considered legally a part of dar al-Isldm, hijra is not necessary except in the case in which corruption is widespread and, further, the madhhab considers corruption to be an operative factor. For the Hanafis, a territory may be ruled and controlled by non-Muslims and yet still be classified as a part of ddr al-lsläm. According to the Hanafi school, a territory is considered to be part of dar al-Isldm if the laws of Islam are applied. However, a territory that previously was a part of ddr al-Isldm and was conquered by non-Muslims does not become a part of ddr al-kufr unless three 55 Ibid., vol. 4, 249. 56 This issue requires separate monographic treatment. Al-Baghd�di, Us�l, 270, discusses the terms d�r al-Isl�m, d�r al-�m�n, d�r al-shirk, d�r al-fisq, and d�r al-kufr; al-Ash'ar�, Maq�l�t, 154, discusses six different positions on d�r alIsl�m; the Ib�d� Kharij� Khamis al-Shaqas� al-Rust�t�, Manhaj al-T�lib�n waBal�gh al-R�ghib�n, ed. S�lim b. Sulaym�n al-H�rith� (Cairo: Mustaf� al-B�b� alHalabi, 1979), discusses six positions on d�r al-Isl�m, mentioning the terms d�r al-khil�f, d�r al-'adl, d�r al-ikhtil�t, d�r al-nif�q, and d�r ahl al-iqr�r. The Zaydi jurist, al-Murtad�, in his Kit�b al-Bahr, vol. 6, 468-69, adds the terms d�r al-waqf and d�r al-�m�n. Al-Makki al-'Amil�, al-Lum'a, vol. 2, 383, mentions bil�d al-khil�f. Jurists also disagreed on the status of a particular territory. See, for example, al-Fat�w� al-Hindiyya, vol. 6, 310; Taqi al-D�n Ibn Taymiyya, alFat�w� al-Kubr�, ed. Muhammad 'At�' and Mustaf� 'At�' (Cairo: D�r alRayy�n, 1988), vol. 3, 532-33 . Sh�fi'�, Hanaf�, and even Hanbali jurists often speak of d�r al-hudna or d�r al-muw�da'a. See, for example, Bad�'i', vol. 7, 109; vol. 2, 197; Kashsh�f, vol. 5, 96; vol. 4, 182 . For a modern discussion of the issue, see Rashid Rid�, al-Fat�w�, ed. Sal�h al-D�n al-Munajjid and Y�suf Q�f Kh�r� (Beirut: D�r al-Kitab al-Jad�d, 1971 ), vol. 1, 372, vol. 5, 1966 -67, vol. 6, 2302 and 2589 conditions are fulfilled: The laws of non-Muslims are applied; the conquered territory is separated from the rest of ddr al-Isldm by nonMuslim territory; and no Muslim or dhimmi enjoys the protections provided by the previous government (äminan bi'l-amdni al-awwal.)57 According to this view, territories conquered by Christians or Mongols remain Muslim territory as long as prayer is allowed or as long as Muslim judges remain in office. In fact, in the opinion of some Hanafi jurists, as long as a single Muslim law is in force such territory remains a part of dar al-Isldm. This meant not only that Muslims were under no obligation to emigrate but also were encouraged to stay if they could do so safely.58 As to territory that is legally considered ddr al-kufr, Muslims do not have a duty to emigrate but are recommended to do soy Shdfi'i jurists went further than their Hanafi counterparts, maintaining that conquered Muslim territory never reverts to the status of dar al-kufr. Conquered Muslim territory is ddr al-kufr in appearance only, not in law. Whether or not a Muslim may continue to reside in such territory depends on whether he or she can contribute to its Islamization. The Shafi'i position, as noted, developed in stages but it seems to have become well-formulated by the tenth/sixteenth century.? Shdfi'i jurists start out by stating that whether non-Muslim territory is considered ddr al-kufr in appearance (that is, conquered Muslim territory) or in law, it is preferable that Muslims migrate even if they are able to manifest their religion. Migration is preferable because these Muslims might unwittingly add to the strength of non-Muslims and they also run the risk of becoming oppressed. But such migration is not mandatory because the Muslims are able freely to practice their religion. If these Muslims hope that by residing among non-Muslims they might contribute to the spread of Islam, then it is preferable that they not migrate. If Muslims are autonomous and can maintain a degree of independence (qadirü 'ald al-imtina wa al-i'tizdl -literally, imtina' means self-protection and i `tizdl means segregation), then it is obligatory upon them to continue to reside in the non-Muslim 57 Ibn '�bid�n, Radd, vol. 3, 252; Bad�'i', vol. 7, (where safety is the key issue and not the laws of Islam).
58 vol. 2, 232, vol. 3, 584 (with Theological doctrines combined with political polemics because, for most Malikis, choosing to reside in a non-Muslim land was a religious and ethical decision as much as a political one. Muslim lands, Islam and a moral life, became inseparable. Making the political decision to favor non-Muslim territory is the ultimate unethical act.
Hanbali and Shi'i jurists, who were not involved in this particular dilemma to the same extent as the Malikis, adopted a compromise position. They conceded that a good, ethical Muslim might prefer to reside among non-Muslims. But lest this admission be understood as a 61 Shams al-D�n al-Man�fi al-Raml�, Nih�yat al-Muht�j (Cairo: Mustaf� alBabi al- Halab�, 1967), vol. 8, 82; al-Shirb�n�, Mughni, vol. 4, 239; Qalw�b� and 'Umira, H�shiyat, vol. 3, 226-27 . Sh�fi'� jurists also contend that a Muslim should constantly search for lands in which he or she can perfect his or her religious practice. This means that a Muslim should migrate from a Muslim territory in which corruption is widespread. Al-Shirb�n� (ibid.) asserts that if all territories become equally corrupt, as was the case in his time, the duty to migrate drops entirely. political concession, Hanbali jurists, in particular, maintained the superiority of Muslim territory even under the worst of conditions. Hanafi and Shafi'i jurists in the seventh/thirteenth century confronted a harsh reality similar to the one confronted by the Malikis as Muslim territory came under siege by Christians and Mongols. Unlike the Malikis, the Hanafis and Shafi'is predominated in areas that were closer to the heartland of Islamic territory, and their response was more sophisticated and discriminating. They distinguished between Islam and the territory of Islam. Islam could exist in non-Muslim territory and, at times, it is morally imperative for Muslims to maintain Islam in foreign lands. But they refused to admit that territory conquered by non-Muslims necessarily becomes un-Islamic. As befits great legal minds, their response was, "it depends." The doctrine of hijra continued to play a dynamic role in religious and political polemics, undergoing subtle changes, often with revolutionary consequences.
One thread that runs through the fabric of juristic discussion is the tension between Islam as a universal moral imperative and Islam as a territorially based political identity. The tension is perhaps unavoidable, and the solutions worked out by Muslim jurists are neither uniform nor dogmatic.
In order to better understand the dynamics of this tension, we must consider a different issue. What is the relationship of these Muslims to the Islamic polity? Does the Islamic polity accept Muslims who reside in non-Muslim territory as its own or reject them as outsiders? If one argues that these Muslims are apostates, for example, one way to examine the intensity of the disassociation is to ask, Are they treated as Muslims by the Islamic polity or are they completely excluded? A response to this last question sheds light on the nature of the tension and on the extent to which, for Muslims, questions of theology intermingle with questions of political identity. The Hanafis argue that inviolability stems from the protection that Muslim territory is able to afford its residents. But they distinguish between what they call 'isma muqawwima and 'isma mu-aththima. The first is legal, the second, moral inviolability. A Muslim residing in non-Muslim lands enjoys moral inviolability but not necessarily legal inviolability.
Relation to the Islamic Polity
For example, if a Muslim kills another Muslim in nonMuslim territory, he or she is not held criminally liable in Islamic courts. The killer is, however, a sinner and is held accountable by God in the Hereafter. The Hanafi jurists justify this view, in part, on the ground that Islamic courts lack jurisdiction over extra-territorial crimes even if those crimes are committed against Muslims. Some jurists add that a Muslim who resides among non-Muslims and unwittingly contributes to their strength lacks full inviolability. Muslim waives part of his or her inviolability.64 The Hanafi jurist, alZayla'i (d. 743/1343), asserts that the real source of moral inviolability is humanness and not religion (ld nusallimu anna asl al-'ismati bi'l-Isldm bal bi-kawnihi ädamiyyä). Muslim territory affords protection to Muslims and dhimmis residing in it but cannot afford protection to Muslims residing elsewhere.65 Hence, according to the Hanafis, although morally a part of the Islamic community, and although morally inviolable, a Muslim in non-Muslim territory does not enjoy legal inviolability. The prosecution of murder involves intricate jurisdictional problems. The Hanafis extend their analysis of inviolability to situations that do not involve jurisdictional problems, as, for example, the situation of non-Muslim territory conquered by Muslims in which resident Muslims are found. In this situation, Hanafis distinguish between three possible cases. If Muslims conquer non-Muslim territory and find Muslims living there, then their persons are inviolable and they cannot be killed or enslaved. Their minor children are granted the same immunity because legally a minor belongs to the religion of its parents. Movable property is immune from confiscation since it is protected by possession. However, a non-Muslim wife, non-Muslim adult children, and immovable property are not immune: The wife and adult child are responsible for their own religious association; immovable property legally belongs to the territory in which it is found. The second case involves non-Muslims who convert to Islam while in non-Muslim lands and then migrate to dir al-lsläm, leaving behind family and property. If subsequently their homeland is conquered by Muslims, then their minor children are immune but their spouses and adult children are not. Any property not in a person's possession at the time is not immune.
The third case is like the second except that the act of conversion takes place in Muslim territory: A person travels to the land of Islam and then converts. If that person's homeland subsequently is conquered by Muslims, any family, property or money that he or she left behind in dar al-kufr is not immune. The distinction between the second and third case is hypertechnical, but it reveals the extent to which Hanafis emphasize territoriality. In the first and second cases, the fact that the act of conversion took place in non-Muslim lands allowed inviolability to extend, unhampered, to minor children and to movable property in possession, either actual or vicarious. In the third case, the fact that the act of conversion took place in the land of Islam while the minor children were in a non-Muslim land prevented the extension or the flow of immunity because of the difference in jurisdictions.66
The Shafi'is insist that a Muslim is protected regardless of where he, his minor children and his property are located. Muslims do not compromise their inviolability by residing in non-Muslim territory, and it is irrelevant whether or not they are separated physically from their children or property. Indeed, Ibn Hajar al-Haytami asserts that if Muslims reside in ddr al-harb, the territory itself must be under the protection of the Muslim polity. In other words, a Muslim polity is obligated to defend and protect non-Muslim territory that hosts Muslims. This view may be attributable to the fact that under certain circumstances the territory in which Muslims reside is considered a part of ddr al-Isläm.67 The Shafi'is introduce an interesting variation on the issue of inviolability. According to them, if a Muslim murders another Muslim in non-Muslim territory, an Islamic court has the jurisdictional power to hold the offender liable. Nevertheless, the Shafi'is argue that because Muslims living in non-Muslim territory often adopt the appearances and mannerisms of non-Muslims, Muslims might not be able to distinguish between a non-Muslim and a Muslim. Consequently, if a Muslim kills another person, being fully aware of the fact that the victim is a Muslim, full liability applies in an Islamic court. But if the offender was under the mistaken impression that the victim was a non-Muslim, only atonement applies in a Muslim jurisdiction.68
66 vol. 3, Ibn '�bid�n, Radd, vol. 3, 252 (Ibn ' Abidin disagrees with the ruling on minor children in the third case); Ibn Qudama, vol. 10, Murtad�, vol. 6, One must keep in mind that for the Hanafis, d�r al-Isl�m is not necessarily ruled and controlled by Muslims. This is important because the classification of territory as d�r al-Isl�m extends immunity to vast Muslim populations who otherwise live under non-Muslim rule.
67 Ab� al-'Abb�s Shihab al-D�n Ibn Hajar al-Haytam�, Fath al-Jaw�d (Cairo: Mustafa al-B�b� al- Halab�, 1971), vol. 2, 2, 346; Sh�fi'�, al-Umm, vol. 4, 278 (see vol. 7, 361-62, 367-68 for Sh�fi'�'s refutation of the Hanafi position). Like the Sh�fi'�'s, the Hanbalis and Z�hir�s extend full immunity to a Muslim regardless of residence. See Ibn Qudama, vol.10, Ibn Hazm, vol. 7, 309. 68 Al-Sh�fi'�, al-Umm, vol. 6, 35. For the same view from a Hanbal� jurist,
The Ja'fari and Zaydi schools adopt an intermediate position. Generally, both schools insist that Islam and not territory is the real source of inviolability. If a Muslim is found in non-Muslim territory, or if a person converts to Islam and then migrates, leaving family behind, his or her minor children and movable property are all inviolable. Adult children and spouses have an independent status and do not derive protection from the legal status of another member of the family. Immovable property in a non-Muslim territory is not protected because its status derives from its location, not from its ownership.
Additionally, full liability attaches to the murder of a Muslim in nonMuslim lands exactly as if he or she had been killed in dfr al-Isldm.69
Perhaps the most interesting case is that of the Malikis, whose response to the matter of inviolability is as equivocal and confusing as their response to Muslims who refuse to migrate. This confusion is reflected in the fact that jurists from other schools who attempt to describe the Maliki position reach contradictory results.70
The Malikis agree that in the case of murder the offender is liable in a Muslim tribunal regardless of where the crime occured. The confusion arises over the inviolability of persons and property. Muslim; but if the corpse is found in dfr al-kufr the presumption is the opposite. Hanafi jurists generally agreed that the presumption is linked to the territory, but they add that if a corpse found in non-Muslim territory has the appearence of a Muslim then the person should be buried as a Muslim. The Maliki, Ibn Rushd "the grandfather," asserted that regardless of the territory, the corpse of an infant is presumed to be Muslim but that of an adult is presumed to be non-Muslim. Some jurists, from various schools, argued that one must consider the religious composition of the population in which the corpse is found; if the majority are Muslims, then the corpse is Muslim. Shafi'i jurists maintained that regardless of the circumstances the corpse must be treated as Muslim. Even if one suspects that only one corpse out of 100 is Muslim, all 100 must be buried as Muslims,.79 But such comments are scarce and scattered. Perhaps Muslim jurists who did not prohibit residence in non-Muslim territory considered this matter to be a non-issue, and since all schools affirmed the moral inviolability of all Muslims, it followed that Muslim jurists assumed that a Muslim residing in non-Muslim territory should be sent to the Hereafter with the proper rituals as long as his or her religious identity was known. In any case, the relation between rituals and Muslim minorities deserves greater exploration in order to better understand the juristic positions on religion and territorial sovereignty.
In summary, all schools claimed that a bond unites Muslims wherever they may be and all schools affirm a Muslim's moral inviolability. The Hanafis were not opposed to Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory; but for them territory, not Islam, was the source of inviolability.
The Shdfi'is were more receptive to the idea of al-Fikr, 1990), vol. 3, 280; Ibn Rushd, al-Bay�n, vol. 2, 258; al-Nawaw�, al-Majm�', vol. 5, 258-59 .
Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory, insisting that Islam is the source of inviolability in all its forms. Although Muslims morally and legally belong to one community, that does not mean they must all reside within the same political jurisdiction. The Hanbalis and Zahiris discouraged Muslims from residing in non-Muslim territory but accorded inviolability to Muslims who disregarded the moral imperative to reside among Muslims. While concurring with the Hanbali and Zahiri view, the Shi'is maintained that immovable property is not protected because inviolability emanates from the classification of immovable property according to territory, not according to religion.
Although the Malikis were compelled to affirm the moral imperative rendering a Muslim inviolable, some managed to affirm the principle and yet simultaneously undermine it.
The specific positions adopted by the jurists defy a single, comprehensive explanation.
Muslim jurists responded to different historical challenges in different ways, and they responded to the same historical challenges in a diverse and innovative fashion. Moral, political and legal imperatives interacted in a complex and elusive manner. Religious dogma yielded to political reality as much as to self-perpetuating legalistic criteria. Essentialist and dogmatic conclusions fail to capture the dynamics of Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic law frequently distinguishes between a moral rule and a legal rule, and the fact that Muslim jurists insist on the unity of all Muslims at the theological and moral level does not entail that all legal rules must follow accordingly.
The divergence between the moral imperative and the legal rule points to the tensions that permeate a legal system that emanates from a universal theology.
Having examined the relationship between Muslim minorities and the Islamic polity, we now turn to the relationship between Muslim minorities and Islamic law. This inquiry is essential for an understanding of the relationship between non-resident Muslims and Islam. To what extent are these Muslims bound by Islamic law? How should they conduct themselves in non-Muslim lands? If Islamic law does apply to them does it apply as a moral imperative or does it have jurisdictional force? Although the responses to these questions tend to vary according to the school of thought, there is considerable consensus.
Islamic law and Muslim Minorities
The extent to which Islamic law is applicable to Muslims in nonMuslim states and the permissibility of residing in such states are interrelated issues. Many jurists made the permissibility of such residence contingent on the ability to practice Islam, without specifying the extent to which Islam must be manifested or practiced. Clearly, Islamic legal precepts do have a certain degree of universal applicability. Hanafi jurists assert that Muslims residing among non-Muslims should establish congregational prayers, especially the Friday weekly prayers (,lum `a prayers), and the prayer after the month of Ramadan and the new year's prayer ('Id prayers), and should demand the appointment of Muslim judges and governors.8° But the issue was complicated by the question of what is ddr al-Isldm. For example, the very acts recommended by these jurists might transform territory from ddr al-harb to dar al-Isläm.8t Despite the legal classification ascribed to a particular territory, certain political realities remained. Even if a territory ruled by non-Muslims is classified as a part of ddr al-Isldm, the fact remains that the coercive power of the Islamic sovereign is absent. Hence, who is expected to apply Islamic law to these There is no difference between dar al-harb and ddr aI-Islam as to the laws that God has decreed to His people because God says ... [The Prophet has expounded certain laws] and he did not except those who are in ddr al-Isldm or ddr al-harb . He [the Prophet] has not exempted any of his people from any of his decrees, and he did not permit them anything that was forbidden in ddr al-harb. What we are saying is consistent with the Our'an and Sunna, and it is what rational people 80 Ibn 'Abid�n, Radd, vol. 3, 253; vol. 6, vol. 7, 130; Ibn 'Abid�n, Radd, vol. 3, 252; vol. 6, 311. can understand and agree on. What is allowed in bildd al-Isldm is allowed in bildd al-kufr, and what is forbidden in bildd al-Isldm is also forbidden in ddr al-kufr. So whoever commits an infraction is subject to the punishment that God has decreed and [his presence in] bildd al-£wfi does not exempt him from anything. 82
Shafi'i, Hanbali and Maliki jurists often make similar statements, that is, Islamic law applies to Muslims with equal force wherever their residence.83 According to most schools, not only does Islamic law apply as a moral imperative, but also the Islamic polity has enforcement jurisdiction.
Consequently, if a Muslim fornicates, steals, murders, consumes alcohol, or transgresses any other Islamic norm, the Islamic polity has extraterritorial jurisdiction over the infraction, and that Muslim may be punished by the Islamic polity although the offense did not occur in ddr-al-Isläm.84 According to the Shdfi'i jurist al-Shuazi (d. 817/1414-15), "because the prohibitions are the same in both territories, there is no reason for the penalties to be different in any sense."85 But Shafi'i jurists permit an exception in the case of a Muslim residing in non-Muslim territory who claims ignorance of the law as an excuse. If a Muslim commits, say, adultery, in his or her nonMuslim residence, and if that Muslim claims that he or she did not know that this is prohibited by Islamic law, that Muslim is exempted from punishment, but only if this is a first offence. The underlying idea here is that the level of Islamic knowledge in non-Muslim lands might be so poor that Muslims would be ignorant of the basic prohibitions, and it would be unfair to hold these Muslims to the normal standards of Islamic conduct.86
The main dissenters, as might be expected, are the Hanafis, for whom in the case of most infractions, the prohibitions of Islamic law apply without distinction. Hence adultery, theft, murder, defamation (qadhf ) and the consumption of alcohol are prohibited in ddr al-harb as well as in dczr al-Isldm. But this prohibition is merely a moral imperative; a person committing any of these offences in a nonMuslim territory is liable only before God in the Hereafter. Islamic 82 Al-Sh�fi '�, vol. 7, vol. 2, 310; vol.19, 338. 83 Ibn Qud�ma, vol.10, 162; Sahn�n, vol. 4, 425. 84 vol. 2, vol. 6, 35. courts have no jurisdiction over crimes committed outside of Islamic territory and consequently may not punish extraterritorial crimes.87 What is significant about the Hanafi position is the argument that particular Islamic legal prohibitions or laws do not apply outside the territory of Islam. Hanafi jurists argue that a Muslim residing in a non-Muslim territory may deal in usury (i-ibd) with non-Muslims, may sell or buy prohibited substances such as alcohol, pork or an animal killed by Islamically unacceptable means such as suffocation or clubbing (mayta), and may engage in gambling or questionable financial dealings such as insurance schemes and the like -on the condition that such transactions are legal under the laws of the host territory and that the transactions are between a Muslim and a non-Muslim.88 (AlKdsdni adds that such transactions are permitted in ddr al-harh between one Muslim and another).89 Although the reasons offered for this rule are varied, the most salient justification holds that the source of inviolability for money and property is territory. Non-Muslim property, especially abroad, is not protected by Islamic law. Consequently, a Muslim may take the money and property of a non-Muslim in non-Muslim territory by any means as long as he or she does so with the consent of the sovereign in the host territory. That is, as long as the non-Muslim polity does not outlaw such transactions, Islamic law will not intervene in order to protect the monies of non-Muslims from what Islamic law considers to be exploitation.9° Regardless of the justification, according to Hanafi jurists, a Muslim does not incur liability for these acts either in this life or the Hereafter.
The other schools reject both the rule and its justification. The Islamic prohibitions regarding financial transactions are unaltered in non-Muslim territory. Some jurists insist that Islamic law should intervene to make the money of non-Muslims inviolable as far as a Muslim is concerned. 91 Although most Islamic schools formally refused to relax the obligations imposed by Islamic law, some concessions were made. The very fact that a Muslim is allowed to reside in non-Muslim territory entails a concession. Such a Muslim is forced to pay taxes and to contribute to the economic power of a non-Muslim polity. Additionally, Islamic obligations cannot be fulfilled since a Muslim cannot assist or aid the Islamic polity, as, for example, through the performance of jihdd. Despite the formal insistence on the applicability of Islamic law in its totality, in reality many particulars of Islamic law cannot be enforced in a non-Muslim territory. By permitting Muslims to reside in a non-Muslim territory, Muslim jurists were making a de facto compromise, while formally insisting on the universal applicability of Islamic law.
This discussion brings into focus two practical questions. happens if corruption is so widespread that an ideal Islamic life is not possible anywhere?92 Muslim jurists assumed that a Muslim sojourning or residing in non-Muslim territory will do so under an agreement of safe-conduct (amdn), according to which a Muslim is promised protection and in return he or she promises not to take action that is detrimental to the host state and to obey the commands of the host state. All jurists agree that a Muslim must abide by the terms of the amdn. Consequently, a Muslim may not commit acts of treachery, betrayal, deceit or fraud, and may not violate the honor or property of non-Muslims. A Muslim must fulfil contractual obligations, pay off debts and not defraud or deceive a party to a financial transaction.93 also al- Shayb�n�, 96; Ibn Qudama, vol. 4, 162; Ibn Rushd, vol. 2, [10] [11] Sahn�n, vol. 3, 279 . As noted, there are other areas in which different rules apply in different territories. The Hanafis argue that if a woman converts to Islam and migrates to d�r al-Isl�m, her marriage to a non-Muslim becomes null and void, but she is not required to observe the waiting-period ('idda). Al-Sh�fi'� disagrees, asserting that a waitingperiod is necessary whether or not she migrates to d�r al-Isl�m vol. 7, 359) ; for a disagreement on whether a difference in residence between spouses necessarily results in voiding the marriage, see Ibn Qayyim, Ahk�m, vol.1, We already have commented on the second question in the section on hijra. Some jurists argued that if all lands become equally corrupt, it makes no difference where a Muslim resides Mughni, vol. 4, 239 -Shayb�n�, al-Siyar, vol. 2, 507-11; vol. 4, 1486; al-Margh�n�n�, al- Once again the primary dissenters are the Hanafis, who agree that stealing, cheating, deceiving, defrauding and the like, committed in violation of an aman, are immoral and sinful, but hold that, for the most part, a Muslim polity has no jurisdiction over such acts if they are committed outside its own territory. If, for instance, a Muslim refuses to repay a debt or usurps property in non-Muslim territory and then escapes to ddr al-I släm, that Muslim should be advised to return the money if he or she wishes to avoid incurring a sin. Nonetheless, the Muslim polity has no power of compulsion. An exception is made in the case of a Muslim who obtains an amdn before leaving the territory of Islam or obtains an aman through official avenues. Here the amdn is obtained under the color of authority, and it is the official weight of the Muslim state that permitted the Muslim to obtain the amdn in the first place. Consequently, it is as if the Muslim polity, itself, vowed not to commit any illegality. In this case, the Muslim polity does have jurisdiction to compel a Muslim to live up to his or her obligation. The Hanafis also make an exception in the case of non-payment of debt or other acts of treachery between one Muslim and another in a non-Muslim territory. Here the Islamic polity does have enforcement jurisdiction because both parties to the conflict have already accepted the laws of Islam and, therefore, are bound by it. Since what the Hanafis call iltizdm abkfm al-Shari'a (that is, the binding nature of Islamic law), exists for both parties at the time of the infraction, jurisdiction is invested in the Muslim polity.97
As with many other legal issues, the Hanafis are preoccupied with territorial and jurisdictional intricacies and prepared to disengage moral obligations from legal consequences. Although this is by no means uncommon in Islamic jurisprudence it is a prominent feature of the Hanafi school. When it comes to Muslims in non-Muslim territory, there is a set of normative values that apply only at the private level. In the jargon of modern day jurists, while Muslim jurists claim a broad Muhadhdhab, vol.1, 311; Shar�'i', vol.1, 315; , 257 . On the other schools, see al-Shiraz�, al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 2, 338; al-Nawaw�, al-Majm�', vol. 19, 453; Ibn Qud�ma, al-Mughn�, vol. 10, 515-16. 97 Al-Shayb�n�, al-Siyar, vol. 4, 1117 -20, 1125 , 1276 -79 and vol. 5, 1880 , 1884 al-Margh�n�n�, al-Hid�ya, vol. 2, 152-53; Ibn al-Hum�m, Fath, vol. 6, 17-19; al-K�s�n�, Bad�'i`, vol. 7, 132-33; Ibn 'Abidin, Radd, vol. 3, 248; alSarakhsi, al-Mabs�t, vol.10, 61, 95-96; al-Fat�w� al-Hindiyya, vol. 2, 232-33. (The Hanafis have other hypertechnical exceptions; see ibid.) jurisdiction to prescribe, they admit of a more limited jurisdiction to enforce.
Nonetheless, Muslim jurists do not explain what Muslims are to do in case of a conflict between the laws of the non-Muslim territory and Islamic law. There is an obvious tension between the general statements on the universal applicability of Islamic law and the statements on the law of amdn. We already have observed in the fatwa of Ibn Hajar that although Muslims were unable to fully execute their religious obligations they were not required to migrate. We also noted that Muslim jurists do not specify the extent to which Islam must be "manifested" in non-Muslim territory for residence there to be legal.
Perhaps the evasiveness of Muslim jurists on the issue of a conflict between the demands of Islamic law and the demands of the amdn indicates that the only real issue to be decided is residence. Once Muslims were allowed to reside in non-Muslim territory, practical compromises were inevitable, and Muslim jurists may have realized that any attempt to control or regulate behavior was bound to be ignored by Muslim minorities living in different historical situations.
As we observed in the case of hijra, not all principles can be reduced to a clear legal injunction. Rather, there are many gray areas in which acts are disfavored or recommended. This is particularly relevant to the integration of a Muslim residing in non-Muslim territory with the society in which he or she lives. It is one thing to require Muslims to live a moral life in non-Muslim territory, and quite another to permit them to fully integrate with their host societies. Some jurists, like al-Wansharisi, who insist on migration, reject any degree of integration. Other jurists strongly advise Muslims to demand that nonMuslim authorities give Muslims their own judges and governors, that is, limited integration. But Muslim jurists generally are not explicit on the subject of integration nor are they decisive on matters that would necessarily lead to increased integration. It is obvious that Muslim jurists disapprove of full integration, and one senses their view that a Muslim should retain an independent identity as well as some form of separate existence. Muslim jurists often state that marrying a scriptuary woman in ddr al-harb is disfavored (makrfih), although not prohibited. Marriage with non-Muslims in non-Muslim territory, they argue, ultimately will lead to certain dangers such as slavery, the oppression of children who grow up unprotected by ddr al-Isldm, and the loss of Islamic identity among children whose mother will teach them the habits and mores of non-Muslims.9g
As a further safeguard against integration, some jurists advise Muslims to maintain a distinctive appearance.99 Perhaps the most significant issue relating to integration is that of military cooperation between resident Muslims and the host polity. As a general rule, Muslims should not contribute to the military strength of non-Muslims.
Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory should remain neutral in any military conflict engaged in by their host polity, especially if it involves other Muslims. The primary reason for this position is that if resident Muslims support other Muslims in conflict with the host non-Muslim polity that would constitute a betrayal of their amdn, which is strictly forbidden. If the non-Muslim territory is attacked, resident Muslims should remain neutral unless they fear for their lives or for their homes, in which case they may join in defense of the territory. 100 The theme that emerges from the juristic discourse on this issue is that Muslims should maintain a separate identity. Even Hanafi jurists, who invariably focus on territorial affiliation, refuse to consider Muslims in non-Muslim territory as entirely outside the reach of Islamic moral and legal imperatives.
The laws of the host territory must be observed because of the amdn, and even the sacred duty of jihdd is suspended. But the jurists do not specify the extent to which Islamic moral and legal obligations may be compromised in case of a conflict. Had they rejected all compromises, Muslim residence in nonMuslim territory would have been impossible. Significantly, Islamic jurisprudence developed several mechanisms and concepts that facilitate and sanction compromise, such as duress (ikräh), necessity (çlarüra), and public welfare (maslaha).101 As noted earlier, the Maliki jurist, al-Wahrani (d. 909-10/1504), issued a fatwa in which, relying primarily on the logic of duress and necessity, he advised the Muslims of Granada how to practice their religion in secrecy. In the fatwd, he specified how prayers, ablutions and fasting could be performed while avoiding detection. For example, one might substitute discrete up-and-down movements of the head for prostration and kneeling in prayer, and one might perform any one of five daily prayers whenever possible, instead of at its allotted time. Al-Wahrani also advised that if compelled to do so, Muslims might consume alcohol and pork and deal in usury.'°2 Unfortunately, not many of these fatwäs are extant, and it is not known if a fatwa such as alWahrdni's is representative.
Muslim jurists commonly discuss a hypothetical case, similar to the factual situation confronted by al-Wahrani, in which corruption becomes so widespread ('umcim aljasäd or idhd tabaqa al-hardm) that transactions become tainted by some degree of Islamically unacceptable defect. For example, oppression might become so widespread that one would not know if property bought or sold originally had been illegally usurped. Alternatively, financial transactions might involve usury or other prohibited dealings. In that case, it is not possible for Muslims to live according to the dictates of Islamic law without suffering material harm. An example often offered by the jurists is that of a Muslim unable to purchase a residence without engaging in prohibited financial dealings; that Muslim may either purchase the house and violate Islamic law or observe Islamic law and not purchase the house. Al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) notes that this is more or less the situation in his own age. Because the refusal of Muslims to compromise eventually will lead to their weakening and destruction, compromises are permitted and, at times, required. Muslim territories and homes, al-Juwayni argues, will be taken over by nonMuslims as they lose the ability to defend themselves. Under these circumstances, one may engage in prohibited transactions not only to satisfy "necessities" (qarüriyyät) but also "needs"(f;äjïyyät).103 AlJuwayni adds that Muslims should migrate to better lands, if they are able to do so. But if the large size of the Muslim population makes migration difficult, then they must not wait passively for their situation to improve; rather they must meet their needs and maintain their strength 102 Cited in L.P. Harvey, The distinction between "necessities" and "needs" is a major issue in Islamic jurisprudence. Generally, "necessities" are considered to be the basics of life such as food, water and shelter, whereas "needs" encompass education and good health. Although people may try to live in accordance with a religious dogma, they always will interpret it in ways that are socially and culturally specific. Historical challenges and developments could force the followers of a once secure and confident dogma to reexamine their ethical and legal principles.
The fact that increasing numbers of Muslims were coming under non-Muslim tutelage was one such historical challenge. The Islamic response developed over a long span of time, changing, adapting and, at times, becoming defiant and uncompromising.
Notwithstanding the variety of responses and reactions that we have discussed, the fact remains that our inquiry remains inadequate. Most of the available sources are written from the perspective of Muslim jurists residing in ddr al-Isldm who pass judgment on those in dar al-kufr. Even in the fatwä literature, whereas the questions emanate from Muslims residing in dar al-kufr, the responses are issued by muftis living in ddr al-Isldm.
From the fatwds of 'Ulaysh, al-Wansharisi, Ibn Hajar and alRamli, we learn of an unrepresented side in the discussion. These texts refer to a debate between those who chose to stay and those who chose to migrate. Unfortunately, the arguments and solutions worked out by the residents of ddr al-kufr are not preserved in the standard Islamic sources. The surviving sources manifest a certain ambivalence toward Muslims in non-Muslim lands -toward their dilemmas, their literature and their arguments. Rules and principles are worked out by jurists in an unequal, disparate and disjointed fashion. For instance, the Shaft' and Hanafi discussion of hijra is more systematic than that of the other schools. But even these two schools make no attempt to deduce guiding principles and systematic ethical standards that would address the problem in its totality. Often the casuistic methodology pursued by the jurists is inconsistent with the general, and sometimes, universal, character of the solutions they propose. This results in many ambiguities and poses a special problem deserving careful study. Perhaps the tensions and the historical challenges proved overwhelming for jurists who served as the protectors of the Shari'a. Perhaps equivocation and ambivalence were adopted deliberately so as not to undermine the moral position of fellow Muslims subject to nonMuslim rule, or so as not to impose burdensome restrictions on Muslim minorities living a very specific and particular social reality. Further research is needed to shed light on these speculations.
My objective in this essay has been to call attention to this field of research and to point out the major issues of debate and contention. I have argued that fully developed positions were articulated only after the sixth/twelfth century in the aftermath of the Christian invasions in the West and the Mongol invasions in the East. In my view, the positions of the different schools should be viewed as historical responses to historical challenges. One discerns several tendencies within the juridical tradition.
To paraphrase the language of contemporary lawyers, some classical jurists, most notably Shi'is, Hanbalis and Shäfi'ïs, were inclined toward universality both at the theological and jurisdictional level. For them, Islam and ddr al-Isldm are not synonymous ; if Muslims are able to practice their religion in a territory, they may reside in it regardless of the formal categorization of the territory. However these Muslim minorities are subject to the universal enforcement jurisdiction of ddr al-Isldm.
Most Maliki jurists were inclined toward territoriality but only at the theological level. Islam can exist only in territory formally ruled by Muslims. The formal categorization of the territory is the definitive factor determining the legality of residence. Hanafi jurists were territorially inclined as well but in a very different sense: The territory of Islam is the source of inviolability and jurisdiction, but that does not mean that Islam can exist only in the territory of Islam. Although ddr al-Isldm is the source of jurisdictional power and sovereignty, the territory of Islam is not synonymous with Islam. Why did the Hanafis insist that former Muslim territories remained a part of dar al-Isldm despite the fact that Muslim power and sovereignty were missing? The fact that Shafi'i jurists reached a similar position leads one to believe that this was a direct response to the Mongol invasion of the Muslim heartland. In fact, some Hanafi sources specify that territories conquered by Mongols remain Muslim.'06 Even the Hanbali Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327-28) puzzled over the status of one such territory, concluding that it is neither dar alIsldm nor ddr al-harb, but "something in between."107 Despite the historical progression of the juridical positions on hijra, one observes very little development of the issue of the universal applicability of Islamic law and the inviolability of Muslim minorities. The statements made by jurists in the third/ninth century are repeated nearly verbatim six centuries later. This may be due to the fact that the only real issue to be decided is migration. If the legality of residence in non-Muslim territory is admitted, all other issues are secondary. In order to highlight the differences between the schools, I selected . several subjects and compared the position of each school on that issue. A systematic study of the premises and logic of each school on the conceptions of ddr, power, and 'isma is bound to shed light on several significant issues.108 Such an approach would clarify the extent to which specific decisions articulated by jurists are a function of systematic theoretical conceptions, reactions to historical challenges, or the result of casuistic thinking. Further, because the relationship between each jurist and the power structure in his locality is likely to have influenced his positions and understandings, the social and political context within which each jurist lived needs to be analyzed. Each jurist reacted not only to the theoretical premises of his school but also to domestic and foreign circumstances. Therefore, one should ask:
Were jurists who enjoyed a closer relation to the power structure more inclined to be concerned with issues of safety, stability and the official hegemony of the Shari'a while those who were distant or opposed the power structure were more concerned with questions of religious purity and social justice? Did the social and political position of each jurist incline him to be less or more accomodating toward Muslim minorities who, intentionally or not, might challenge the authority of the rulers of dfr al-Isldm? These and other issues await a systematic monographic treatment. Rida (1865 Rida ( -1935 complaining that an Ottoman jurist had told the Bosnians that they must all migrate to Muslim territory.
Rida wrote a scathing attack of the Ottoman jurist, insisting that Bosnians should remain in their homeland. 109 The idea of hijra continued to develop in the colonial age, serving as an ideology of resistance and opposition to colonial powers, and, later, as an ideology of rebellion against indigenous Muslim governments, as in the case of the followers of Sayyid Qutb.110 The power of the idea of migration in Islamic thought often produced mass movements, sometimes with tragic consequences, as evidenced by the infamous migration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan in 1920.11 ? I
Despite the intense debates on hijra and despite the fact that about one-third of all Muslims live in non-Muslim countries,112 the ambivalence characteristic of the pre-modern age continues. Few modern Muslims attempt to deal with ethical or legal principles that should guide the behavior of Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory. Few modern scholars have attempted to maintain and develop the traditional discourse on the affiliation and inviolability of Muslim minorities.
Early in this century, Rashid Rida was asked if a Muslim in Lebanon may rent a room in a hotel that sells alcohol. Rida first argued that Lebanon and Syria were not then a part of dar al-Isldm. Building on the pre-modern discourse, Rida argued that the Islamic civil law does not apply to Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory. Muslim minorities are bound only by the laws pertaining to acts of worship (`ibdddt). Consequently, a Muslim in such a situation may rent the room and deal in usury or other questionable financial transactions.
Relying on the logic of necessity and the arguments advanced by al-Juwayni, Rida argued that Muslims must be able to protect their interests in non-Muslim territory in order to maintain their financial strength, and, hence, to defend themselves against possible oppression.113
Rida drew on Hanafi jurisprudence and the principle of necessity to prioritize Islamic goals and resolve inherent conflicts. But discussions such as this are very rare in the modern age. 
